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ABSTRACT 
Legal ontologies are generalised conceptual models of specific 
parts of the legal domain. They provide stable foundations for 
knowledge representation. The ontology presented in this paper is 
based on an analysis of the relation between the legal domain and 
knowledge about that domain. It is explained how knowledge in 
the legal domain can be analysed in terms of three dimensions 
(acquisition, object and justification), and how these dimensions 
can be employed in alternative designs for collaborative work-
spaces. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
‘Knowledge’ is a key term in AI & law research. It takes a central 
place in the representation of the legal domain, because a large 
part of that domain consists of (or is constituted by) knowledge. 
As such, the value of knowledge is unchallenged. Still, on many 
occassions, the relation between knowledge and the domain it is 
about remain obscure. The same is valid for the characteristics of 
knowledge. The research described in this paper is a follow-up to 
earlier work on legal ontologies (cf. [5], [7], [11], [15]). It is an 
attempt to take a closer look at what legal theory can contribute to 
the analysis of the concept of knowledge in the legal domain. It 
does so in order to unveil the meaning of this concept, considering 
such phrases as ‘legal knowledge representation’. Often, knowl-
edge representation refers to the representation of elements of the 
legal domain and relations between these elements, rather than to 
knowledge about these entities and relations. An analysis of the 
difference between knowledge about a domain and the domain 
itself can help to prevent conceptual confusion. Thus, it may 
prove relevant to a well-founded legal ontology. 
In this paper, I explain the foundations on which the knowledge-
based ontology is built. First, I explain three dimensions of 
knowledge that constitute the basis for the ontology (section 2). 
Second, I discuss the role and value of knowledge in a model of 
the legal domain, and the basic constituents of the model (section 
3). Third, I provide an explanation of the practical relevance of 
the ontology (section 4). Finally, I pay attention to further re-
search (section 5) and I provide a conclusion (section 6). 
2. THREE DIMENSIONS OF  
KNOWLEDGE 
To elaborate on the role that the concept of knowledge plays in 
the legal domain, I start from two relevant disciplines: ontology 
and epistemology. Ontology scrutinises the existence of (legal) 
entities, such as rules, norms, and legal institutions, and the de-
pendencies between these entities. Epistemology regards the ac-
quisition, object and justification of knowledge. Together, ontol-
ogy and epistemology can provide an integrated view on the legal 
domain, thus facilitating the representation of knowledge. Below, 
the three dimensions of knowledge are discussed: acquisition 
(subsection 2.1), object (subsection 2.2), and justification (subsec-
tion 2.3). 
2.1 Acquisition 
Knowledge can be acquired from various sources, for instance 
through the sources Audi [2] lists: perception, memory, con-
sciousness, reason, and testimony. Although legal knowledge may 
arise from the same sources, the focus is somewhat different. This 
applies especially to the content sources of legal knowledge, i.e., 
sources that are classified because of their content rather than by 
the acquisition method employed. These are the so-called knowl-
edge sources for the law. The content of legal knowledge is often 
derived from formal and material sources of law. In the Dutch 
legal system, formal sources of law are, according to Algra and 
Van Duyvendijk, statute law, treaties, and legal precedents [1]. 
Customary law is often also considered a formal source of law.  
Material sources of law are the origination sources of law, i.e., 
those factors that contributed to the drafting and interpretation of 
positive law. Material sources of law themselves cannot be re-
duced to legal rules or legal norms. They form, however, the 
grounds for those rules and norms. For instance, as soon as a 
judge has made a decision in a case, and he has based his decision 
partly on the consequences his decision will have for the social 
structure (socio-economical developments constitute a material 
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source of law), he establishes a verdict (a legal precedent is a 
formal source of law). Material sources of law are, for instance, 
political powers, pressure groups, religious beliefs, and moral 
beliefs.  
Knowledge sources for the law are the sources through which we 
acquire knowledge about the law. Acquiring (explicit) knowledge 
about the law requires us to know two properties of the law: its 
content and its validity. Knowledge about the two properties is 
acquired in different manners for different legal-philosophical 
stances. In a legal-positivist stance, formal sources of law largely 
coincide with valid law. Thus, if one acquires knowledge of the 
formal sources of law, one will acquire knowledge of both the 
content and the validity of law. In a natural-law stance, however, 
this is not necessarily the case; the validity of law is also deter-
mined by principles that are not part of the system of positive law, 
and thus are not part of the formal sources of law. Thus, the re-
construction of the acquisition of legal knowledge depends on the 
legal-philosophical stance taken. 
2.2 Object 
Knowledge generally is about something. It reflects some view on 
how things relate to each other in reality. For instance, knowledge 
is about the weather, a book, or a judgement. In that case, the 
weather, book, or judgement forms the object of knowledge. The 
main difference between the object of legal knowledge and the 
object of regular knowledge, is that the object of legal knowledge 
largely consists of intangible institutions and entities, which 
brings about the danger of a confusion of the object of knowledge 
and the knowledge itself.  
I discern two categories within the object of knowledge about the 
legal domain. The first object category is legally-relevant, the 
second object category is legal. The objects within the first cate-
gory are situations in the world that are relevant for the legal do-
main, i.e., entities, facts, acts, and practices that have not (yet) got 
assigned a legal status. The objects within the second category are 
situations in the world that are part of the legal domain, i.e., enti-
ties, facts, acts, and practices that have been assigned a legal 
status. For instance, the object category of knowledge about the 
fact that John hit a pedestrian with his car is not legal. However, 
the object category becomes legal whenever the fact has the as-
signed legal status of criminal negligence. 
The confusion of knowledge with the object of knowledge often 
starts when the object of knowledge is intangible: if it arises from 
reasoning or interpretation, or if it is an artifact resulting from 
social conventions. Whereas it is easy to distinguish the situation 
that John hits a pedestrian from the belief ‘John hits a pedestrian’, 
it is somewhat harder to distinguish an interpretation from a belief 
about that interpretation. The reason for this is that interpretations 
are not objects in the same way as we can regard, for instance, 
toys as objects: we cannot hold, feel, and look at interpretations 
from different angles (i.e., not literally), whereas in the case of 
toys, we can. We construct interpretations ourselves, and by doing 
this we ‘make’ knowledge. At the same time we add something to 
the world: a new interpretation, a new object of our knowledge. 
2.3 Justification 
Justification amounts to those circumstances in which the content 
of some entity or behaviour is sufficiently defended. Such a de-
fence can be given in an explicit way: in terms of reasons for the 
content of an entity, or a proof of the content of the entity. A de-
fence can also be given in a rather implicit way, for instance by 
establishing a high chance that the belief is true. Justification thus 
consists of all those factors that make us believe something. Justi-
fication is found in several forms. The typology I give in this 
subsection is partly based on Audi ([2], p. 2-3). I distinguish three 
main types of justification: justification as a state, justification as 
a process, and justification as a status. 
The first main type of justification is justification as a state. It 
refers to a situation in which an entity is justified, or in which a 
person is justified in believing something. A distinction of sub-
types of justification as a state is possible on the basis of the en-
tity that attains the state of justification. This entity can be a be-
lief, a person, a proposition, or a situation. For instance, if there 
are sufficient reasons for justifying a proposition, that proposition 
is in the state of being justified. The second main type of justifica-
tion is justification as a process. A state of justification can, but 
need not be, the result of a successful process of justification. 
Such a process may consist of exchanging reasons, or applying 
certain rules, or any series of acts that aims at accomplishing a 
state of justification. For instance, the different steps in a penal 
trial among others aim at reaching a clear picture of the actual 
facts. The rules that govern this process let the different parties 
present and explain their stances, and by presenting the evidence 
and responding to each other, ideally relevant and true statements 
are made as a conclusion. The third main type of justification is 
justification as the status of an entity. It refers to the justifying 
role an entity can play. For instance, a fact can be qualified as a 
reason, and then its justifying role is based on a status layer of the 
fact. In the example given above, the fact that Mary’s name is in 
the marriage register can be qualified as a reason for believing 
that Mary is married. Because it has the status of a reason, it per-
forms a justifying role with respect to the belief that Mary is mar-
ried. 
All three justification types are found in the legal domain. Some 
of the instances of the types are actually institutionalised in the 
law. An example of justification as a state is the legitimate char-
acter of evidence (which is attained by acquiring evidence in a 
lawful manner). An example of justification as a process is the 
application of parts of civil procedural law, which guide two par-
ties in exchanging arguments. An example of justification as a 
status is the legitimising force a piece of evidence exerts towards 
a conclusion (e.g., evidence for finding a suspect guilty). 
3. CONSTITUENTS FOR A MODEL OF 
THE LEGAL DOMAIN 
The knowledge-based ontology leaves open the possibility of 
expressing different views on the role of knowledge and the exis-
tence of entities in the legal domain. On a theoretical level, this 
enables us to avoid taking a stance in the legal-philosophical de-
bate prior to building the model. In this sense, the model devel-
oped may be called a ‘meta-ontology’ of law – it allows for dif-
ferent views on what knowledge in the legal domain actually 
amounts to. On a practical level, the model allows for a detailed 
description of the context of knowledge items – how they are 
acquired, what they refer to, and how they are justified. To attain 
this, the model distinguished between ontological status layers 
and epistemic roles. The ontological status layers allow for differ-
ent views on the existence of entities in the legal domain, and the 
epistemic roles allow for expressing different views on what 
knowledge amounts to. In subsection 3.1, the value and utility of 
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the knowledge concept are discussed. In subsection 3.2, the ele-
ments of the model are further explained. In subsection 3.3, I 
discuss epistemic roles. 
3.1 The value and utility of knowledge 
The relevance of knowledge about the legal domain is twofold. 
First, there is the utility of knowledge. Compared to mere belief, 
knowledge can be used as a reliable ground for behaviour. It may 
also serve as a means of gaining authority relative to those only 
having belief. In the legal domain, knowledge provides grounds 
for authoritative decisions. Rather than basing one’s decision on 
relatively unreliable beliefs, the basis for one’s inferences should 
be knowledge. Second, attaining knowledge is a goal that is worth 
aiming at as such, regardless of its utility. An argument with this 
content is put forward by Finnis ([3], p. 59-80). He claims that the 
pursuit of knowledge is a value, in the sense of a good: a goal that 
is worthwhile independent of any further utility in the achieve-
ment of survival, power, and popularity. The value of attaining 
knowledge is a principle of practical reasonableness, Finnis 
claims. It provides us with a direction in which we can lay out 
lines of argumentation. It can be used to generate new principles, 
and to direct the application of rules. In his discussion of the value 
of knowledge, he emphasises the importance of truth. Having 
knowledge presupposes truth, whereas beliefs can be true or false. 
Knowledge and truth are very close relatives, if we may regard 
the following quotation as representative of Finnis’ opinion on the 
matter ([3], p. 61): 
“In explaining, to oneself and others, what one is up to, one 
finds oneself able and ready to refer to finding out, knowledge, 
truth as sufficient explanations of the point of one’s activity, 
project, or commitment.” 
Finnis regards the value of knowledge as a self-evident principle. 
He asserts that self-evidence of some principle has little or noth-
ing to do with our feelings of certitude about that principle. 
Rather, he claims, the self-evidence of a principle shows itself in 
its employment as a criterion for the assessment of feelings. A 
principle such as worthiness of knowledge cannot be proved. It 
can be adopted, though, on the assumption that its employment is 
fruitful, or rather, that, if it is not adopted, rational discourse be-
comes hard or impossible. In sum, legal knowledge is a better 
starting point for making inferences (the utility argument), and it 
is worthwhile in its own (the value argument).  
Knowledge, I claim, may be regarded as the mark of a quality 
stamp. It is a mark of approval; it says that a belief or a skill con-
forms to a set of criteria, and that it deserves to be called ‘knowl-
edge’ for that reason. The applicable set of criteria depends on the 
type of entity that we wish to qualify as knowledge, and the con-
text in which we encounter that entity. For instance, if we wish to 
qualify a belief about the whereabouts of a suspect as knowledge, 
we may demand that this belief is true. However, if we wish to 
qualify a belief about the value of a piece of circumstantial evi-
dence as knowledge, we demand that this belief is justified rather 
than true. Knowledge is a value predicate, a way to express the 
worthiness of an entity.  
Representing knowledge thus requires to make explicit the criteria 
by which the represented entities deserve their qualification as 
knowledge. These criteria may apply to the acquisition, object 
and justification of knowledge. Thus, they do not only concern 
the content (object) of knowledge, but also the sources of knowl-
edge (acquisition), and the reasons there are to believe its content 
(justification). Together, the criteria provide a framework for 
assessing whether to assign the quality mark. What is more, they 
provide valuable additional information on represented knowl-
edge. For that reason, the concept of knowledge is useful, even if 
its meaning does not conform to the traditional view of having 
one set of criteria that determines all possible instances of the 
concept. 
3.2 Basic categories of the knowledge-based 
model of the legal domain 
In most existing models of law, there is no clear distinction be-
tween knowledge about the legal domain on the one hand, and the 
legal domain itself on the other hand, or there is focus on only one 
of the two elements. Knowledge about the legal domain may play 
two roles: as the object of a model of the legal domain (repre-
sented by the arrow between boxes 1 and 2 in Figure 1), and as a 
potential part of the legal domain (because of the mutual depend-
ence between knowledge about the legal domain and the legal 
domain itself, represented by the arrow between boxes 2 and 3 in 
Figure 1). 
 
  
→ 
(2) knowledge about the 
legal domain 
 ↑↓ 
(1) the model repre-
sents:  
- knowledge about the 
domain 
- the domain itself → 
  
(3) the legal domain 
Figure 1. Distinction between model, knowledge and domain 
 
An ontology specifies what elements and relations we can find in 
the legal domain. As a consequence of incorporating the concept 
of knowledge, the resulting ontology caters for the need to ex-
press relevant characteristics of knowledge about the legal do-
main. In Table 1, I give an overview of main types and subtypes 
present in the knowledge-based model of the legal domain. The 
basic types and subtypes represent categories of things and 
phenomena that are typical of the legal domain.  
 
Table 1. An overview of the knowledge-based ontology 
Type Legally-relevant Legal 
Entities sentences 
statements 
propositions 
beliefs 
artefacts 
rules 
concepts 
legal rules 
legal principles 
legal norms 
legal decisions 
legal systematisations 
judicial interpretations 
judicial classifications 
legal concepts 
Ontological 
status  
layers 
existence 
constitution 
recognition 
legal efficacy 
legal validity 
legal recognition 
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Type Legally-relevant Legal 
Epistemic 
roles 
reasons 
defeaters 
factual knowledge 
practical knowledge 
factual legal knowledge 
practical legal knowledge 
Relations causation 
counting as 
recognition 
legal causation 
legal counting as 
legal recognition 
Acts applying rules 
making decisions 
making systematisations
making interpretations 
making classifications 
applying legal rules 
making legal decisions 
making legal systematisa-
tions 
making judicial interpreta-
tions 
making judicial classifica-
tions 
Facts brute facts 
recognised facts 
conventional facts 
institutional facts 
recognised legal facts 
conventional legal facts 
institutional legal facts 
 
Although I will not go into all individual elements of the ontol-
ogy, some words on its main types ought to clarify the model. 
Entities are basic objects that are encountered in the legal domain. 
They may be assigned certain characteristics in the form of onto-
logical status layers and epistemological roles. Ontological status 
layers are the existence characteristics of legally-relevant and 
legal entities, acts, and facts. Epistemic roles are claims regarding 
objects, signifying their function in acquiring or justifying knowl-
edge. Relations express interdependencies among phenomena. A 
relation may state the consequences of some event, or impose new 
roles on existing objects. Acts indicate the operations of individu-
als and institutions in the legal domain. Facts involve objects, the 
characteristics of those objects, characteristics of characteristics, 
and relations between objects and between characteristics. They 
express the attributes of entities, individuals and institutions, or 
the relations between them. The core of the ontology is found in 
the ontological status layers and epistemic roles, as they represent 
the characteristics regarding the existence and knowledge status 
of entities. 
3.3 Epistemic roles 
As explained before, ontological status layers and epistemic roles 
form the core of the ontology described in this paper. As the on-
tology aims to accommodate different views on existence and 
knowledge in the legal domain, it has to provide for the means to 
represent these views. In this section, I discuss epistemic roles, as 
they play a major role in the practical application proposed in 
section 4. Epistemic roles are claims regarding objects. They have 
two functions. Either they signify the function an object has in 
granting the knowledge predicate to a different object, or they 
signify the knowledge predicate itself. The former function is 
fulfilled by the epistemic roles reason and defeater, the latter by 
the roles factual knowledge and practical knowledge. If an object 
(e.g., a belief) has reason as its epistemic role, it supports the 
content of a statement, i.e., the object functions as a means to 
make us believe the statement. Therefore, it helps to turn the 
statement into knowledge by contributing to its justification di-
mension. Thus, the epistemic role of one item may help to estab-
lish a different epistemic role for another item. 
Reasons – Reasons are statements, propositions or facts that are 
employed for the explanation or justification of some other state-
ment, proposition or fact (cf. [6]). Each reason has a content (its 
meaning relative to its subject and object), a subject (a person, a 
group of persons or an authority, or there is no subject at all), an 
object (a belief, an action, a decision, a classification, an interpre-
tation, or another reason), and a specific relation between subject 
and content (believe, constitute), and between content and object 
(explanatory, guiding). 
Defeaters – A subclass of reasons is formed by defeaters. Defeat-
ers are negative reasons, i.e., they attack some belief or reason in 
such a way that it is no longer correct. A special class of reasons 
is formed by defeaters. Defeaters undermine reasons. Defeaters 
that directly attack the conclusions of an argument are called ‘re-
butting defeaters’. Defeaters that attack the relation between a 
reason and its conclusion are called ‘undercutting defeaters’. With 
an undercutting defeater, the assumption is challenged that some 
statement or fact is indeed a reason for a conclusion ([12], p. 196). 
Just as reasons, defeaters can be classified according to the dis-
tinctions made above. A defeater has a content, a subject, an ob-
ject, and there is a specific relation between subject and content, 
and between content and object. The specification of a defeater in 
terms of these characteristics is thus comparable to the specifica-
tion of a reason.  
Factual knowledge – The epistemic role ‘factual knowledge’ is 
granted to an entity if that entity complies with certain so-called 
knowledge criteria. Suitable entities are beliefs, statements and 
propositions. Knowledge criteria regard the acquisition, object 
and justification of knowledge. Reliability of acquisition, the truth 
relation between knowledge and its object, the coherence of a 
system of beliefs, and the justification of the content of knowl-
edge together support the granting of the knowledge predicate. 
Factual knowledge concerns those parts of knowledge whose 
content can be expressed in a natural language. For a discussion 
of knowledge criteria, cf. [9], [10]. 
Practical knowledge – The epistemic role ‘practical knowledge’ is 
granted to those entities that comply with certain demands. Unlike 
factual knowledge, practical knowledge does not apply to well-
described entities. Instead, it applies to certain skills and compe-
tences, for instance to the assessment capabilities of a judge, or 
the pleading skills of a lawyer. Criteria for such knowledge are 
somewhat harder to determine, as the acquisition, object and justi-
fication dimensions are unclear. Rather than an existing object, 
against which knowledge can be tested, practical knowledge often 
produces new objects. The acquisition dimension thus becomes a 
production dimension, which can still rely on the reliability crite-
rion. This applies especially to the legal domain, in which the 
ability to defend or assess a case, or to make a judgement, heavily 
depends on the experience of a legal professional. 
4. PRACTICAL RELEVANCE OF A 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ONTOLOGY 
The link between legal theory and legal practice is not made very 
often, and maybe even less so in AI-and-law research. The ontol-
ogy described above offers such a link – to a certain extent. It 
describes how basic roles of knowledge are accommodated in a 
conceptual model of the legal domain. Thereby, it helps contextu-
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alising knowledge – to provide relevant background information 
on the content of legal information systems. The relevance of the 
distinctions explained in this paper is summarised in the following 
elements: 
(1) The distinction, within the ontology, between factual knowl-
edge, practical knowledge and the legal domain caters for the 
need to maintain, as far as possible, a clear dividing line between 
knowledge and its object, which applies to the content of informa-
tion systems. 
(2) The relevance of a view on knowledge is to acquire and proc-
ess knowledge in the legal domain in an effective manner. A clear 
concept of knowledge is a prerequisite for using and processing 
knowledge in legal information systems as well. 
(3) The main dimensions of knowledge are relevant to provide 
useful contextual meta-information on acquisition, object and 
justification. In most cases, knowledge in legal information sys-
tems is provided without such information, so that the user has no 
opportunity to assess its quality. 
The different types of information on the nature of knowledge and 
the status of objects can thus help to fulfil the information needs 
of individual users. They can also provide a more natural embed-
ding of functions in a legal information system with respect to a 
given legal tradition. Epistemic roles are translated into practical 
criteria that connect to a legal tradition: criteria for the practical 
status of legal rules, and the usability of knowledge.  
The relevance of distinctions, metadata and criteria relating to the 
knowledge-based ontology covers part of the range of legal in-
formation systems (cf. [8]): authoring systems, database systems, 
and knowledge-based systems. Systems that process or make 
available information generally offer the opportunity of making 
use of meta-information. I distinguish between two types of meta-
information. The first type enables unambiguous (automated) 
communication about elements, such as issuing information about 
legal rules, and is defined in, for instance, the MetaLex standard 
(for Dutch legal information). The second type is aimed at the 
content of elements, and concerned with the way in which these 
elements may be used in practice. Below, I discuss an application 
type in which the analysis of knowledge can be usefully em-
ployed (subsection 4.1), and a functional outline of such a system 
(subsection 4.2). 
4.1 Collaborative workspaces 
A potential field of application for meta-information is formed by 
collaborative workspaces. If we take a closer look at the devel-
opment of such applications, we can discern a development to-
wards mechanisms to value individual contributions and con-
tributors. The attitude of workspace participants towards a con-
tribution may be expressed in valuations and justifications of 
those valuations. These valuations may be backed by profiling 
information on a collaborative workspace member, establishing a 
reliability profile for that member. This profile can be used by 
others to determine whether they are inclined to believe and use 
the contribution. In a legal context, much of the work on doctrine may well benefit 
from the interaction among different academic lawyers and practi-
tioners – where it is now almost exclusively the domain of spe-
cialists making individual contributions to a relatively small num-
ber of journals. Interaction opportunities are present, but they are 
slow and reserved for a limited number of legal professionals. The 
combination of collaborative workspace techniques with the ele-
ments of the knowledge-based ontology may form a fruitful envi-
ronment for knowledge development and enhancement in the field 
of legal doctrine.  
With respect to the three dimensions of knowledge, the opportuni-
ties take the following form. The acquisition dimension may, for 
instance, require participants to indicate how they have acquired 
the information they use in their arguments (the origination source 
of the information), so that other participants can establish the 
reliability of that information. The object dimension may, for 
instance, require a clear indication of the content source of the 
information, enabling other participants to check such sources and 
to assign value to them. The justification dimension requires par-
ticipants to argue their positions and their comments on other 
participants’ contributions.  
The justification dimension has been subject of extensive research 
(cf. [4], [6], [13], [14]). A collaborative workspace environment 
offers the opportunity to use meta-information on the acquisition, 
object and justification of knowledge to direct the interaction 
between participants towards a satisfactory result, in fact, towards 
the construction of knowledge. Implementing criteria relating to 
the three dimensions of knowledge thus enables the support of 
procedural and substantive justification, while taking into account 
both the truth, reliability and coherence of the knowledge content 
of a system. As such, knowledge criteria may act as a guidance in 
the exchange of ideas about a certain legal issue, and form the 
main reference points for assigning value to those ideas.  
4.2 Outline of functionality 
The outline of a collaborative workspace system based on the 
three dimensions of knowledge is as follows. The basic elements 
distinguished are reasons, defeaters, conclusions (which may also 
be intermediate conclusions), annotations and participants. An 
annotation is the full text that is constructed from combinations of 
the other elements. Knowledge criteria can be valued with respect 
to each of the elements.  
Table 2 (see next page) indicates the way in which the value for a 
knowledge criterion with respect to an element is determined. 
With respect to the reliability and justification criteria, elements 
are assigned a value between 0 and 1. With respect to the truth 
and coherence criteria, one of three values is assigned: for truth, 
the values are true, false and not applicable, and for coherence, 
the values are coherent, incoherent and not applicable. A brief 
explanation of the ways in which the values are determined fol-
lows below. 
The reliability of an element (except for participants) is deter-
mined directly on the basis of the reliability value for the partici-
pant who introduced the element. Reliability is measured as a 
value between 0 and 1. The initial reliability of a new participant 
can be set by the other participants. Participants can earn a higher 
(or lower) score by the evaluation of their contributions by other 
participants. The reliability of a participant is calculated from (1) 
the number of positive and negative valuations and (2) the rele-
vance of the elements for which the valuations are determined. 
The value true or false can be assigned to an element (a reason, 
defeater or conclusion) by individual contributors under two con-
ditions. These conditions are: the truth or falsity of an element 
ought not be disputed by a different participant with a certain 
minimum reliability score, and the reliability of the element itself 
ought to have a certain minimum value. Of course, the assignment 
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of the value true to an element only establishes the assumption 
that the element is true. If the assignment of the value is not dis-
puted, this adds to the reliability of the participant. 
Table 2. Valuations within a collaborative workspace 
criteria → 
↓ elements 
reliability truth coherence justification 
reason equals reli-
ability of the 
participant 
who intro-
duced the 
element 
assigned by 
participant 
not  
applicable 
valuation of 
justifying 
force with 
respect to a 
conclusion 
defeater equals reli-
ability of the 
participant 
who intro-
duced the 
element 
assigned by 
participant 
not  
applicable 
valuation of 
rebutting 
force with 
respect to a 
conclusion 
conclusion equals reli-
ability of the 
participant 
who intro-
duced the 
element 
assigned by 
participant if 
no defeaters 
present 
not  
applicable 
valuation of 
justification 
status 
 
annotation equals the 
average 
reliability of 
the partici-
pants 
not applica-
ble 
valuation of 
coherence 
between the 
elements of 
the annota-
tion 
valuation of 
justification 
status 
 
participant equals the 
average 
valuation of 
participant’s 
contribu-
tions 
not applica-
ble 
valuation of 
coherence 
across an-
notations 
valuation of 
being justi-
fied in taking 
a stance 
 
The value coherent or incoherent can be assigned to an element 
by individual contributors under two conditions. These conditions 
are: the postulated coherence or incoherence of an element ought 
not be disputed by more participants than it is supported by, and 
there ought to be a minimum value for the justification status of 
the element. If the assignment of the value is not disputed, this 
adds to the reliability of the participant. 
The value for the justification criterion is either an initial value, 
equal to the reliability value for the participant who contributed it, 
or a derived value, based on the presence of reasons or defeaters 
for a conclusion. In both cases, the value can be adjusted by par-
ticipants. In the latter case, the system calculates a justification 
value on the basis of justification values of reasons and defeaters 
pointing to the element at hand. In addition, the value of individ-
ual elements, and the justifying or rebutting force an elements 
exerts towards a different element, can be valued by participants 
by increasing or decreasing the assigned value.  
An example of a calculation for a justification value is as follows. 
There are two reasons and one defeater for a conclusion. Reasons 
p and r have justification values with respect to a conclusion of 
respectively 0.8 and 0.7, defeater q has a ‘negative’ justification 
(rebutting) value of 0.3 towards the same conclusion. The initial 
justification value for the conclusion is calculated by a simple 
division of (0.8 + 0.7 – 0.3) by 3 is 0.4. Because the combination 
of reasons does not necessarily lead to a higher degree of justifi-
cation, this is only an indicative value. Justification values can be 
adjusted by individual participants, but only to a certain degree, 
depending on their reliability value. The higher a participant’s 
reliability, the more he or she can influence the justification value 
of an item. 
On the basis of the valuation of different criteria with respect to a 
given element, the knowledge predicate can be assigned to those 
elements that comply with a certain fixed set of criteria, for in-
stance a sufficient degree of reliability and justification. The 
knowledge predicate functions as a simple identifier for those 
elements that form the consolidated core of content of the collabo-
rative workspace. 
The work on an annotation is enabled by a number of possible 
moves: participants can introduce subjects, they can introduce 
reasons, defeaters and conclusions, they can comment on any of 
these, they can value an element, and they can recall an element. 
The value and predicate assignment guidelines described above 
constitute only a rough idea of an actual collaborative workspace, 
as such an environment should include a rule set that provides a 
stable discussion environment, in which new participants and 
participants with dissenting opinions still have a say. 
5. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research on the applicability of epistemological insights to 
collaborative workspaces in a legal context has to include an en-
gineering component and an empirical evaluation, as the feasibil-
ity and practicability of a complex collaboration framework have 
to be proved in a test environment. The presence of a rewarding 
system (found in the valuation of contributions by peers) inevati-
bly leads to strategic behaviour, which may induce the necessity 
to remodel the rule set. Additionally, other issues have to be ad-
dressed, such as whether participants should remain anonymous. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I have explained the ideas on which the knowledge-
based ontology of the legal domain is based. Starting from two 
disciplines, namely ontology and epistemology, I explained three 
dimensions of knowledge. The acquisition, object and justifica-
tion dimensions of knowledge constitute a framework that lets us 
(1) distinguish between knowledge and its object, (2) determine 
criteria to assess the quality of knowledge, and (3) distinguish 
ontological status layers and epistemic roles to accommodate 
different views on legal knowledge. On the basis of an overview 
of the model of the legal domain, I gave an example of its poten-
tial application in a collaborative workspace environment. 
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